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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
WILLL\M G.\RTH SEEGMILLER
and ~L\RjORIE SEEGMILLER, dba
~L\DE~lOISELLE BEAUTY SALON,
or i\1.\l)E~lOISELLE SALON OF
BE1\UTY,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, Case No. 9933
vs.
:\L HUNT, dba MADEMOISELLE
COIFFURES,
Defendant-Respondent.
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
STATEMENT
Defendant has advanced several propositions in his
brief that were not dealt with by plaintiffs. He has also
misconstrued the evidence in several respects.
Inasmuch as the opposing parties to this litigation
have cited the same basic decisions in support of their
respective positions, a close consideration of the facts and
of the legal principles_ applicable thereto becomes of paramount importance.
The lower court found, as facts, that the parties are
operating in different trade areas and that there is no
competition between them. It found, however, that, except for this, defendant's use of plaintiffs' mark would be
confusing.
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I

LOWER COUR1,'S FINDING OF FACT AS TO
TRADE AREAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
The statement of facts in defendant's brief does not
give a true picture. It is apparent from a careful review of the evidence adduced by plaintiffs that the trial
judge ~erred in his finding as to trade areas..
In challenging plaintiffs' assertions of extensive advertising coverage, defendant at page 4 of his brief correctly points to limited TV advertising, but is in error with
respect to radio advertising (see Tr.26, 71 ) and as to there
being only one ad in the "Daily I-Ierald" (Tr. 25, 71 ) ,
and d·oesn't do justice to the testimony concerning circulation of the "BYU Universe." Mr. Seegmiller testified
without objection or contradiction (Tr. 15, 16) that there
are from twelve to thirteen thousand students at B.Y.U.
and that he, as an alumnus, receives this university newspaper in his home and has for many years. The Court
recognized '(Tr. 16) that the paper is distributed to aU
the students and to some of the townspeople of Provo,
Utah. The record shows throughout, and it is believed
·that judicial notice can be taken of the fa·ct, that the student body of B.Y.U. is made up of students from many
parts of Utah, including Ogden and its environs, and that
there is considerable moving back and forth of townspeople between Provo, Ogden and Salt Lake City (see,
for example Tr. 161-167).
Defendant's brief (p. 4, last para.) points to the
cross-examination of certain of plaintiffs' witnesses to
show that p'laintiffs' trade area "did not extend northSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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\vard beyond Salt Lake City and probably not beyond
lJtah County on June 2, 1961" when they applied for
rcgistra tion of their trademark. Yet, Mrs. Seegmiller
testified \vith respect to a total of seventeen specified individuals from Weber, Davis, and Cache Counties (Tr.
t ~l9-151) and at least eleven from Salt Lake City and
environs who come more or less regularly to plaintiffs'
beauty salon in Provo for their permanents and special
hair tinting, styling, etc. Only one, Mae Degn, was shown
to have moved from Ogden prior to the adoption of plaintiffs' present name and mark, and this was not contrary
to Mrs. Seegmiller's direct testimony. Only two, Mrs.
Lawrence l\1iHs and 1\Iarlene Symthurst, were shown to
have become plaintiffs' patrons after adoption and use of
the name by defendant.

Helen Sanderson of Logan had patronized plaintiff
for four years prior to testifying in April 1963 (Tr. 151).
~Irs. \lan Lewen, mother-in-law of Gwen Van Lewen,
has a home in both Ogden and Springville and has been
~l regular customer (Tr. 166). Gwen, who lives in Ogden
but attended Provo High School until 1962 while her
father \\~as living in Ogden (Tr. 166), has been a patron
e\·er since the opening of plaintiffs' "Mademoiselle" salon.
~Iany from the Salt Lake City area have been patrons
since the opening (Tr. 1~ 7-149), and three have made
rnany purchases of the trademarked hair spray both in
Salt Lake City and Provo (Tr. 170).
Leone Boothe has lh?ed in-Brigham City since November 20, 1959. For the previous fifteen years she lived
in Salt Lake City. She relies on Marjorie's (Mrs. Seegmiller's) supervision and has recommended plaintiffs' saSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Ion by its name "Mademoisel1e" to various friends in Brig1

ham City (Tr. 92, 93). T·his and the foregoing are in
striking contrast to the assertions on page 5 of defendant's
brief.
If the lower court meant by its finding of "different
trade areas" that plaintiffs draw none of their trade from
the Ogden area, this finding is clearly contrary to the evidence.
II
CONSIDERATIONS OF LAW
If the lower court meant that plaintiffs draw the
bulk of their business from a different trade area than
defendant's and that the relatively small amount coming
from the same trade area is inconsequential, its conclusion of law is erroneous and its decision must be reversed.
In his brief, defendant has quoted extensively from
the Restatement of Torts. The quoted matter at the top
of page 11 of his brief clearly supports plaintiffs, for they
are seeking protection of their trademark and tradename
with reference to territory from which they have received, and, with the probable expansion of their business,
may reasonably expect to additionally receive, customers
in the business in which they use their trademark and
tradename. The quoted matter under "Comment a" on
the same page leaves out the follo\ving pertinent portion:
"If the trade-mark or trade name is unknown in a
particular territory and there is no probability that
it will become known there, the use of a similar
designation in that territory will cause no harm to
the person having the trade-mark or trade name,
since it cannot lead to mistaken association with that
person." (3 Restatement of Torts, par. 732, p. 604).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The testimony clearly shows that plaintiffs' trademark and tradename are neither unknown nor static in
'Veber, Davis, and Cache Counties. Those who know of
the trademark and tradename tell their friends, and there
is a continuing coming to B.Y.U. at Provo of students
from these three counties and a continuing returning of
these students to their homes in the same three counties.
Both Dell Harrie, manager of Paramount Beauty
Supply, Salt Lake City, and Dorothy Odekirk, Mutual
Beauty Supply, testified from personal knowledge that it is
not unusual for women to travel at least a hundred miles
to a favorite salon for special hair treatment such as permanent waves (Tr. 104, 105, 111, 123). Ann Stanger
testified that she had sent cards announcing the opening
of plaintiff's salon to several women in Logan and Ogden
(Tr. 84, 85).
Certainly, plaintiffs' and defendant's "different trade
areas", as they are characterized by the lower court, are
not "separate markets wholly remote the one from the
other," as required by the Hanover Star Milling case if
the question of prior appropriation is to be legally insignificant (see quoted matter on page 7 of plaintiffs'
main brief). Rather, defendant's trade area is a market
into which the use of plaintiffs' trademark and tradename
have extended and their meanings have become known
and are continuing to further become known.
III
LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
The use of plaintiffs' mark and name in Ogden and
the advertising thereof throughout the surrounding area
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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by defendant has very likely caused and is very likely to
continue to cause harm to plaintiffs by mistaken association.

On page 6 of its brief, d.efendant asserts that no
actual confusion has ·ever resulted and refers to Tr. 33 for
support. There, Mr. Seegmiller merely testified to the
fact that no one had ever told him that business had been
done with the de£endant's establishment thinking it was
plaintiffs'.
There is, however, testimony as to several instances of
actual confusion. Letty B. Hust, who lives in Ogden and
buys plaintiffs' trademarked hair spray from Mr. Seegmiller in Salt Lake City, was confused when she saw defendant's newspaper ads (Tr. 18, 27, 77-78, 80). Mr.
Seegmiller :testified to hearing and denying rumors that
they had opened a salon in Ogden (Tr. 30). Many of
the Ogden students at B.Y.U. have asked plaintiffs
wh·ether the Ogden salon was theirs (Tr. 34). The order
clerk at Peerless Beauty and Barber Supply in Salt Lake
City was confused (Tr. 93). Dorothy Odekirk of Mutual
Beauty Supply, Salt Lake City, testified to incidents of
confusion (Tr. 120, 183). Sharon Whitaker, a former
student of B.Y.U. whose home is in Ogden, testified that
she had mentally associated defendant's establishment in
Ogden with plaintiffs' in Provo (Tr. 138) and had actually visited the former on two occasions (Tr. 135).
Although Sharon Whitaker inquired as to whether
there was any connection between the two salons and
received the proper information, there is considerable likeSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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lihood that others have not made and might not make
such inquiry, in which event plaintiffs would have lost or
may lose business intended for them. Sh·ould the services
rendered by defendant's salon have been, or should they at
any time be, unsatisfactory, plaintiffs might have lost or
might well lose future patronage, either from those who
would otherwise travel to Provo for their permanents and
other special services and products, or from B.Y.U. students home in Ogden and its environs for the summer.

IV
PLAINTIFFS HAVE CONTEMPLATED FUTURE
EXPANSION
Defendant asserts that plaintiffs have not contemplated future expanision into defendant's trade area (Tr.
6). Yet, the very testimony referred to as support for this
assertion shows that expansion to both Salt Lake City and
Logan has been contemplated (Tr. 177).
Plaintiffs adopted their trademark for hair spray
because a wholesale drug firm told them it wanted to
distribute both their hair spray and shampoo (Tr. 16-17).
Later, this same firm asked them about use of the mark
on cosmetics, and this was one of the reasons Mr. Seegmiller undertook to register the trademark in June 1961
(Tr. 29). Because of the present litigation, this arrangement for widespread distribution of the trademarked
products has never been consummated.
The probability of territorial expansion by the first
user of a trademark, although no expansion had acSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tually been undertaken and no question of bad faith by
the adverse user was involved, has been regarded as important by recent cases.
"Thus, the rights to a trademark extend throughout the entire territory actually served by the owner,
or covered by his advertising, and also, it would seem,
at least to an area which would provide room for
probable or anticipated expansion. See Hanover
Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. at page 415;
Food Fair Stores, In·c. v. Food Fair Stores, 1 Cir.,
177 F. 2d 177, 83 USPQ 14; Triangle Publications,
Inc. v. Central Pub. Co., W. D. Mo., 117 F. Supp.
824, 100 USPQ 185."
Huber Baking Co. v. Stroehmann Bros. Co.
252 F. 2d. 945; 116 USPQ 348, 356 (2nd Cir.,
1958)
"By reason of the fact that long before plaintiff's
claimed uses, Utah was within the defendant's normal expansion territory for its use of the trade name
"American Oil Company" and its trademarks
"American" and "Amoco," defendant is entitled
under the common law of Utah to the exclusive intrastate use throughout Utah of said trade name and
trademarks, and to an injuction against plaintiffs
. u tah.... ,,
use In
Nielsen v. American Oil Co.
203 F. Supp. 473; 133 USPQ 188, 191 (D.C.
Utah, 1962)
See also:
Younker v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.
175 O.S. 1; 137 USPQ 901, 906 (Ohio Sup. Ct.,
1963)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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v
PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR TRADEMARK

REGISTRATION
Defendant attempts to show that plaintiffs are guilty
of swearing fa~lsely to the affidavit that accompanied
their application in June 1961 for Utah State trademark
registration and, therefore, come into court with unclean
hands.
This stand is completely wi~thout merit and should
lead the Court to examine with great care the other assumptions and reasoning employed by d·efendant.
Defendant takes his stand on the assumption that the
wording "or a trade-mark, trade name, or service mark
previously used in this state by another" in Sec. 70-3-2
(6), Utah Code Annotated, refers to use by someone oth·er
than the applicant prior to the application for registration, whereas the only possible meaning is such a use prior
to the applicant's use.
Whether or not plaintiffs knew of defendant's use of
their name and mark at the time of their application is
entirely immaterial. The only thing that could defeat
plaintiffs' rights in any part of the State of Utah would be
the establishment of con1mon law rights by another in
some portion of the State prior to plaintiffs' registration
(Sec. 70-3-15, Utah Code .A.nnotated). Whether or not
defendant has acquired adverse common law rights in
the Ogden area is up to this Court to decide. If it upholds defendant's asserted claim, plaintiffs' registration
should remain valid and in force as to all who cannot
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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similarly assert adverse common law rights. Such is the
intent and purpose of the Statute.
"All the States and the Federal Government
have some legislation pertaining to trade-marks ...
The legislation is of the declarative type; that is, it
does not create the trade-mark right, but only recognizes existing rights and provides for their greater
protection . . . By providing a registration record, the
legislation also aids those who desire to adopt marks
which do not infringe existing trade-marks. But registration is not required and trade-marks may be
protected though they are not registered." ( 3 Restatement of Tort, par. 715 (f), p. 55 7).
Defendant cross appeals for alleged damages resulting from plaintiffs' registration. There is obviously no
merit in this cross appeal.

VI
DEFENDANT'S USE OF "l\1ADEMOISELLE"
The pretrial stipulation between plaintiffs and defendant (R 8, 9, No. 5) reads "Defendant was known by
some customers" under the disputed tradename "Mademoiselle" prior to June 2, 1961. This is something quite
different from the statements of "many" customers, as
found in the first full paragraph of page 2 and the first
paragraph of page 6 of defendant's brief.
At the top of page 7 of his brief, it is said that defendant "had previously (prior to June 2, 1961) become
identified by his trade name 'Mademoisell~e Coiffures' in
Weber County and north Davis County (Stipulation R 8,
No. 5 ) and the Court so determined . . . ". This is an assumption that is unwarranted by either the cited stipulation or by the findings. Moreover, it is unsupported by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the evidence. Defendant's advertising commenced on
~fay 19, 1961, but the salon didn't open until May 29th.
If the Memorial Day holiday is excluded, there were only
three working days before June 2, 1961, when plaintiffs
registered their mark.

There is nothing of significance in the newspaper advertisements run by defe~ndant or in anything else of record which would lead the public to identify the name or
mark with someone other than plaintiffs. The evidence
all points to the fact that defendant's Ogden establishment was associated in the public mind with plaintiffs'
Provo establishment.
On page 16 of his brief, def,endant assumes that he
had built up a "secondary meaning" for plaintiffs' trademark identifying him, as against plaintiffs, in the public

mind in a total of less than two weeks of advertising and
only a few days of actual operation. This would be far
fetched in any view of the circumstances of this case and
of the law applicable thereto. The Federal statute and
most state statutes, including Utah's, require a showing of
fh·e years of exclusive use to establish prima facie second~l ry meaning.
VII
OTHER ERRORS IN DEFENDANT'S BRIEF
On page 13, defendant cites Blue Bell Co. v. Frontier
Refining Co., 213 F. 2d 355 ( 1954) as a Utah case decided by the Supreme Court of Utah. It is actually a
Federal case of the lOth Circuit affirming a decision by
Judge Ritter in the District Court for Utah involving
very different facts than exist here. As recognized in deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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fendant's brief, the quoted matter is purely dictum and
is not supported in its broad connotations either by Judge
Ritter's d·ecision in the very recent case of Nielsen v.
American Oil Co. (supra) or by the other cases cited
under Point IV herein.
From the Sweet Sixteen quotation and accompanying statement appearing on page 15 of defendant's brief,
it is apparent that defendant does not understand the
difference between a technical or common law trade mark
and a mark that becomes protectible at common law only
by reason of the acquisition of a "secondary meaning."
(See Addenda).
The Sweet Sixteen case recognized no need for a
considera:bl~e number of potentially misled customers in
order to establish market confusion in instances of a
technical trademark, such as "Sweet Sixteens" or "Mademoiselle" (See p. 11, def' s brief) .
ADDENDA
To avoid confusion in meaning of certain terms as
commonly employed in the law of trademarks and unfair ·competition and as here employed by plaintiffs, in
contrast to the way they are employed in the Restatement
of Torts, the following explanation is given:
"Trade-mark" as used in the Restatement has the
same meaning as "technical trademark" as commonly
employed. It is a mark actually applied to goods sold in
commerce and having no inherent disability, such as
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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being a word descriptive of the goods, a geographical
term, or a surname. It requires no showing of secondary
meantng.

As commonly employed, the word "trademark" is
a broad designation. It applies equally to a technical
trademark and to a descriptive or geographical word or

surname that becomes, in legal effect, a technical
trademark by reason of acquiring a secondary meaning
(see Nim "Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks," 4th
Ed., pp. 511' 512).
a

"Trade name" as used in the Restatement means
either a business name, as contrasted with a mark actually
applied to goods sold in comm·erce, or a word used as a
trademark but requiring the acquisition of a secondary
meaning before it is given the legal effect of a technical
trademark.

As commonly employed among trademark attorneys,
a "tradename, is nothing more than a business name, i.e.
the name under which a person does business. When such
a name is also applied to goods as a trademark, its legal
status depends upon whether, in any given instance, it is
used as a tradename or as a trademark. In the present
case, "Mademoiselle" is used by plaintiffs as both a tradename and a trademark, but by defendant only as a tradename.
:\ "service mark" is a creature of Federal and State
statutes, so far as equivalency to a trademark is concerned. Otherwise, it is regarded legally much as a busiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ness or trad·e name is (see Daphne Robert "The New
Trade-Mark Manual," p. 16).
The Utah statute, Title 70, Utah Code Annotated,
contains no definition of nor does it provide for the registration of a "trade name," but it is clear from Sees.
70-3-2 (6) (7) that the term, as used, means a business
name. Registration of a mark that has achieved the legal
status of a technical trademark by the acquisition of a
secondary meaning is provided for in Sec. 70-3-2 (5).
Plaintiffs' mark was registered as a technical trademark
or servi·ce mark requiring no showing of secondary meaning (Def's Ex. 2).
Respectfully submitted,

LIONEL M. FARR, Esq.
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Salt Lake City, Utah
PHILLIP V. CHRISTENSON, Esq.
for CHRISTENSON, NOVAK,
PAULSON & TAYLOR
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